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ABSTRACT 
 
A dominant, net buyer of a certain asset receives a private signal that is correlated with its 
mean value. We call this insider a Boesky Insider when the quality of the received signal is 
such that the future value of the asset can be predicted with certainty. We show that even an 
infinitesimal probability of a Boesky Insider results in informational inefficiency of prices. 
Insisting that the equilibrium be continuous in the signal accentuates the inefficiency to the 
extent that no information is conveyed. The informational inefficiency not withstanding, the 
regime that allows insider trading can result in greater liquidity and is, in an ex-ante sense, 
Pareto superior when compared to a regime in which insider trading is banned. 
 
JEL CLASSIFICATION: C72, G12, G14 
KEYWORDS:  Efficient Markets, Insider Trading, Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, Pooling, Public 
Confidence, Zero Probability Event. 
 
 
 
Disclaimer Notice : The responsibility for the opinions expressed in these working  papers 
rests solely with the author(s). The School of Economics and Political Science gives no 
warranty and accepts no responsibility for the accuracy or the completeness of the 
material 
 
We thank Ken Binmore and Drew Fudenberg for helpful comments. 
Contents
1 Introduction 2
1.1 Brief Intuition For Informational Inefficiency . . . . . 4
2 The Model 5
2.1 The Boesky Insider . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3 Insider Trading, The Boesky Insider & Informational
Efficiency 6
3.1 Existence of Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4 Regulated vs. Unregulated Insider Trading 10
5 Discussion and Conclusion 12
5.1 Public Confidence, Liquidity and Insider Trading . . . 12
5.2 Equilibrium Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.3 Robustness of Equilibria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6 Appendix 14
1 Equilibrim exists if (δ, ν) lies in the shaded region. . . 16
figure.1
2 Proposition 4 applies only in the shaded region. . . . . 20
figure.2
1
1 Introduction
“The public’s out there throwing darts at a board, sport. I don’t throw
darts at a board - I bet on sure things” - Gordon Gecko in Wall Street.
The notion that agents have heterogeneous beliefs about the value
of assets is neither new, nor surprising. In some sense, all participants
in securities markets believe that they have superior information to
those with whom they trade. In this sense we all consider ourselves
insiders to a certain degree. The fact that other traders have different
views, based on different information does not lead to a fear of trad-
ing, nor a precipitous decline in the liquidity of markets. Yet what if
the person with whom we were trading might knows that value of the
security for sure? What if they were the CEO of a company about
which there was takeover speculation; of a company which was about
to announce a large earnings downgrade, or upgrade; of a company
which was about to file for bankruptcy? Market participants, regu-
lators and commentators fear the possibility of just such an insider
and it is a major motivation for bans on insider trading.
In this article, we study a model of a securities market involving
a dominant, price setting insider. The insider receives private infor-
mation about a parameter that is correlated with the future value of
a certain asset, and sets the unit price at which she is willing acquire
the asset. When this estimate is perfect so that the insider knows
the future value, then we call that type of insider a Boesky Insider1.
Our main finding is that even if the probability of there being such
an insider is infinitesimal, prices are necessarily informationally in-
efficient in that all equilibria are at least partially pooling. What
is more, the extent of the informational inefficiency is extreme if the
equilibrium is also required to be continuous in this parameter. For
in this case every equilibrium is fully pooling.
The above result calls into question the traditional law and eco-
nomics view2 that allowing insiders to trade on the basis of their
information will improve informational efficiency. Yet informational
inefficiency in itself is hardly the criterion for evaluating the desir-
ability of a policy. Therefore, taking the informational inefficiency of
1The colorful term “Boesky” insider is suggested by the activities of the infa-
mous insider trader Ivan Boesky.
2See Ausubel [1990] for an exposition of this view.
prices as a given, we consider its welfare effects. Specifically, we are
interested in whether regulating insider trading will necessarily lead
to greater welfare, and whether it will result in greater liquidity, as
measured by the expected quantity that is sold.
We study a very simple legal restriction on insider trading which
may be viewed as a stylization of a commonly observed method aimed
at providing all the market participants with a level playing field so
to speak. According to this rule, after receiving the private signal,
the insider has two options. She can either abstain from trading
in the market, or she can make her private information public and
then trade. We shall assume that all such public announcements are
perfectly verifiable. While perfect verifiability of private information
is a strong assumption, it clearly biases the case for regulation.
Given the structure of our model, it turns out that it is always
advantageous for an insider to make her information public and trade
on that basis. As the reports are perfectly verifiable, the regime is
by design, informationally efficient. We shall refer to this regulated
regime as the NI regime.
We compare the welfare of the market participants under the
regulated and informationally efficient NI regime with their corre-
sponding welfare under a particular informationally inefficient fully
pooling equilibrium in the unregulated market. This pooling equi-
librium, which we shall frequently refer to as the PE regime has the
property that the quantity traded is identical to that under the NI
regime. The existence of such a pooling equilibrium is guaranteed
under the assumption that the outsiders display constant absolute
risk aversion and certain simple relationships between the parame-
ters that determine the riskiness in the risky asset and the spread in
the distribution of the signals.
A comparison of the PE regime and the NI regime offers several
interesting insights. First, by construction, the liquidity in the PE
regime is the same as that of the NI regime. Therefore, informational
inefficiency does not imply lower liquidity. Second, it turns out that
depending on the parameter values, the PE regime can Pareto Dom-
inate the NI regime while the converse can never be the case. The
reason for this is as follows. Under the NI regime, it turns out that
the quantity acquired by the Insider is a constant. The price how-
ever varies. By construction, the supply under the PE regime is the
same as that under the NI regime but the price, being a pooling
equilibrium, is also constant. Consequently, the PE regime offers the
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outsider additional insurance. This makes it possible for an outsider
to supply the same quantity as in the NI regime at a lower average
price and still be as well off. As the Insider is risk-neutral, the lower
average price at which she acquires the same quantity improves her
payoff also. In fact, we show that when the signals are uniformly
distributed over a large range, the payoffs under the unregulated PE
regime Pareto dominate those under the regulated NI regime.
The early theoretical literature on the efficiency effects of in-
sider trading argued that insiders would reveal their private infor-
mation (see Grossman [1976], Grossman [1989], Allen [1981], Glosten
and Milgrom [1985] and Verrecchia [1982], among others.). These
papers assumed a competitive market in the sense that the large
trader could not affect the price of the asset through their strate-
gic choice. They find the equilibria that are separating and hence
that prices are informationally efficient. (See Ausubel (1990) and
Ausubel (1989) however.) The informational efficiency of prices and
other actions has also been considered in imperfectly competitive
environments, including the works of Gould and Verrecchia [1985],
Grinblatt and Ross [1985], Kyle [1985], Kyle [1989], Altug [1991],
Laffont and Maskin [1990], Bhattacharya and Spiegel [1991], Fish-
man and Hagerty [1992] and Benabou and Laroque [1992] among
others. Most of these papers restriction attention to strategies that
are linear in the underlying variable.
Ausubel [1990] and Laffont and Maskin [1990] are among the
comparatively few contributions that, to our knowledge, compare
the informational and allocative efficiency of insider trading. The
latter is in an important reconsideration of most of the earlier lit-
erature. Laffont and Maskin criticize the preoccupation with linear
equilibria in most other works and focus instead on the equilibrium
that is most favorable to the insider. Indeed, in the binary signal
model they consider, any strategy is trivially linear. They show that
the most favorable equilibrium for the insider (whenever such an
equilibrium exists) is the one that is fully pooling. The reason that
a pooling equilibrium improves the payoff relative to the separating
equilibrium is that the expected equilibrium price is more or less the
same in a separating and a pooling equilibrium. To ensure incentive
compatibility however, the quantity traded must be constrained and
lower in a separating equilibrium which in turn implies that the in-
sider prefers the pooling equilibrium. Depending on the parameter
values, this may even benefit the outsiders. Adopting the Pareto
principle for ranking the two equilibria, they then argue that an in-
sider may be able to influence beliefs at an ex-ante stage so that
the pooling equilibrium emerges and thus prices are informationally
inefficient.
Our model is related to Laffont and Maskin [1990] but is different
in two key respects. First, we allow the type of the insider to be a
continuous variable. Second, we introduce the notion that there may
be Boesky insiders, albeit with an infinitesimal probability. If one
insists on the equilibrium being continuous, which as a requirement
is clearly weaker than linearity, and is a condition that is not relevant
in Laffont and Maskin [1990], our finding is that every equilibrium
is fully pooling. Therefore the issue of ranking equilibria that differ
in informational content does not arise.
The rationale for why the ban on insider trading does not ben-
efit the insider is also very different to the role played by quantity
constraints in the Laffont and Maskin’s explanation of a a pooling
equilibrium being favorable for the insider. In fact, in our model the
ban on insider trading acts as a pre-commitment device enabling the
insider, being a Stackelberg leader, to fully exploit her dominant po-
sition by allowing her to credibly reveal her private information. In
particular, she will not face the quantity constraints that are implied
by a separating equilibrium. Therefore one might expect that the
insider will necessarily prefer the NI regime to the PE regime. This,
however, is not the case, the reason being that in the PE regime the
constant pooling price faced by the outsiders offers them additional
insurance. This allows them to supply the same expected quantity
as they would under the NI regime but for a lower (expected) price.
Ausubel [1990] offers a public confidence argument3 for regulating
insider trading by introducing an ex-ante investment stage involving
potential insiders and outsiders. Potential insiders may prefer regula-
tion at the later trading stage so that it allows for greater investment
at the ex-ante stage. Regulation can Pareto-dominate the unregu-
lated regime. Our work omits the ex-ante investment stage although
in our model too there is a break down of public confidence resulting
from the presence of perfectly informed insiders. The loss in public
confidence notwithstanding, regulation may be Pareto Dominated, in
contrast to the findings of Ausubel [1990]. The difference can be ex-
3Benabou and Laroque [1992] also offers a related raionale for regulating In-
sider trading.
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plained in part by the fact that there is imperfect competition in our
model whereas the markets are perfectly competitive in Ausubel’s
model. We discuss this further in Section 5.1.
1.1 Brief Intuition For Informational Inefficiency
In the model we study, the insider privately observes a parameter
S˜ that is correlated with the mean of a risky asset. She then acts
as a Stackelberg leader and sets a price p(S˜) at which she is willing
to acquire the asset. The insider is risk neutral while the small
traders are risk averse. When the signal S˜ is a noisy estimate of the
mean value of the asset, for risk sharing reasons, there are gains from
trade even if it becomes common-knowledge. On the other hand if a
particular realization of the signal, say S˜ = s∗, is fully informative of
the future value of the asset so that the dominant trader is a Boesky
insider, there is no further risk. Consequently if s∗ were common-
knowledge among all traders in the market, the otherwise risky asset
and the risk-free bond are perfect substitutes.
Given the above observation, if there were to be a fully revealing
equilibrium in which a positive quantity is traded, then the dominant
trader is forced to set the price of the asset given s∗ to be such that
the return on the asset equals the return on the risk-free bond. Oth-
erwise there would be an arbitrage opportunity. If one now assumes
that the equilibrium price is continuous in the signal, for other values
of the signal close to s∗, the differential on the mean return between
the bond and the risky asset is negligible. Therefore at a noisy sig-
nal sufficiently close s∗, the risk averse traders would strictly prefer
to sell almost their entire endowment of the risky asset and invest
the proceeds in the bond. Incentive compatibility conditions, which
require the quantity traded to be non-decreasing, then force the out-
siders to trade their entire endowment for all signals higher than s∗,
thus contradicting the hypothesis that the price is fully revealing.
In a nutshell, the fact that there is a Boesky insider constrains the
return on the asset at s∗ to equal that of the risk-free bond. Even
though the probability of this event is infinitesimal, due to incentive
compatibility, it will have repercussions for all other values of s∗.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we
present the basic model and discuss the assumption of Boesky In-
siders. Section 3 considers the case of insider trading and presents
three results: Proposition 1, the result on informational inefficiency,
Proposition 2, a sufficient condition for checking when an arbitrary
price-quantity combination can be supported as a pooling equilib-
rium outcome and Proposition 3 which identifies the equilibrium de-
scribed as the PE regime earlier. In Section 4 we introduce the legal
restriction on insider trading and compare the welfare in PE and NI
regimes. Proposition 4 and (its) Corollary 1 contain the welfare
comparisons between the regulated and unregulated regimes.
We emphasize that Proposition 1 is the only result that relies
on the presence of Boesky insiders. As such, the rest of the paper,
particularly the comparisons of the welfare effects of the informa-
tional inefficient pooling equilibrium in the PE regime vis-a-vis the
regulated NI regime, can be read independently of this result.
2 The Model
Two assets are traded in period 1, the values of which are realized
in period 2. One of these assets is a risk free bond that offers a
sure return of R > 1, with its current price being normalized to
one. The period 2 value of the second asset, on the other hand, is
the realization of a random variable, say V˜ which follows a normal
distribution whose mean and variance are not a priori known.
In period one however, a large dominant trader receives a private
signal S˜ by which she becomes informed that conditional on S˜ = s,
the distribution of V˜ is normal with the mean s and variance σ2s .
The signal itself is continuously distributed according to a probability
distribution F (·) with [a, b] as its support. We shall refer to the large
trader as the Insider or Player D of type s when she observes S˜ = s.
Player D has an initial wealth of m units of money and a zero unit
endowment of the risky asset. After finding out her type, she acts
as a Stackelberg leader by setting the price at which she is willing to
acquire the asset. The large trader’s strategy is therefore a function
p : [a, b] −→ R+. For each s ∈ [a, b], the strategy p(·) specifies a
price p(s) at which Player D is willing to trade the asset. We shall
routinely refer to a strategy of Player D as a “pricing strategy”. The
expected profit of Player D of type s if she acquires q units of the
risky asset at a price ρ is:
V (q, ρ, s) = Rm+ q(s−Rρ) (1)
We assume that Player D is risk neutral and maximizes expected
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profits. It is only natural to allow the large trader the option of
refusing to trade. The utility of no-trade is mR.
The market also contains a unit mass of identical, risk-averse
price taking traders. As we assume that no such trader directly
observes the signal S˜, we will often refer to them as outsiders. Each
outsider has an endowment of w0 units of money one unit of the
risky asset. If an outsider were to supply q units of the risky asset
at a unit price of ρ and invest the proceeds in the risk-free bond, her
future (stochastic) wealth is w˜ = w0R+ qρR+ (1− q)V˜ .
Assume that an outsider satisfies the expected utility hypothe-
sis and let u(·) denote the appropriate von Neumann-Morgenstern
expected utility functional. If the outsider were fully informed that
the signal is S˜ = s, then her expected utility is E[u(w˜)|S˜ = s]. The
actual information that an outsider has will depend on the regime
that we are studying. In Section 4 where insider trading is regu-
lated, she would know the true signal. In Section 3 where the insider
is allowed to trade on the basis of her information, the optimal al-
location, what she knows is endogenously determined by how much
information the equilibrium strategy of the insider will reveal. In
general, we represent her information about the insider’s type as a
distribution function G(·) with some measurable subset of [a, b] as
its support. Given her belief, her payoff can now be written as
U(q,G, ρ) =
∫ b
a
E[u(w˜)|S˜ = s]dG(s) (2)
Let x(ρ, s) denote the utility maximizing supply of risky asset by
an outsider who believes that V˜ is distributed normally with mean
s and variance σ2s ≡ σ2. Therefore
x(ρ, s) = arg max
q
1
σs
√
2pi
∫ ∞
−∞
u
(
w0 + qρR+ (1− q)(s+ )
)
e−
2/2σ∂
(3)
Throughout the paper we assume u(·) is strictly concave and twice
continuously differentiable. We also assume that u(·) satisfies non-
decreasing absolute risk aversion. An important implication of the
these restrictions is that x(ρ, s) is non-decreasing4 in s for a given ρ.
When the conditional variance is independent of the signals, i.e.
σ2s = σ
2 > 0, the model is similar to most of finance literature
4See Laffont and Maskin [1990] for a proof.
involving rational expectations5. In fact, if we were to make this
assumption, apart from the fact that there is a continuum of types,
the model is identical to the one studied by Laffont and Maskin
[1990]. Such an assumption does not however allow one to say that
one type of insider is better informed than another. One extreme
form to introduce this possibility is to say, as we do here, that the
signal is either “noisy” or “accurate”. When the s is a noisy signal,
σ2s = σ
2 > 0 whereas σ2s = 0 if the signal is considered to be accurate.
In the latter case, we shall refer the corresponding type as a Boesky
Insider. Let
B = {s ∈ [a, b] : σ2s = 0}
denote the set of all Boesky Insiders. A significant innovation of
this work is the study of the implications of the “Boesky Insider” for
informational efficiency.
2.1 The Boesky Insider
There are numerous situations where an insider could be perfectly
informed about the future value of a security. The situation where a
tender offer is being considered is a classic case. In many instances
the recommendation of the board will be sufficient to ensure that
the offer will be accepted. An insider who knew that the board had
decided to recommend the offer would know that the share price
would become equal to the offer price. A company which is about to
sign a merger agreement will have a definitive value known to those
who know that the agreement will be signed. A company which is
going to perform a share buyback will have a share price equal to
the buyback price. If a company is about to file for bankruptcy (in
the sense that its liabilities exceed its assets) the value of its equity
is zero. These situations are widespread. They also arise where the
information does not imply a specific price of an underlying asset but
derivative securities, side contracts or other financial instruments are
involved6. For instance: when the holder of barrier options, so called
5See Grossman [1989] for example.
6An infamous example of such a case involved Ivan Boesky himself. As the
Wall Street Journal reported ”Mr. Boesky testified that Mr. Mulheren responded
’I understand’ after the arbitrager told him ’it would be great if Gulf & Western
[Industries Inc. stock] traded at 45.’ Mr. Mulheren then bought 75,000 shares
of the stock just before the market closed, causing the price to climb to $45 –
which triggered an agreement by G&W to buy back Mr. Boesky’s huge stake” -
5
”knock-ins” or ”knock-outs”, receives information that the price of
the underlying asset will more above or below a certain price, or
where a ”collar” is in place7 which means that the holder is certain
of their payoff outside a defined band of prices of the underlying
asset. This highlights that there are many possible instances where
certainty of information translates directly into certain about the
value of a security.
It is important to distinguish here between certain knowledge
of an event taking place which will which will affect the price of a
security, and certain knowledge of the price of a security. It is the
latter which we mean by a Boesky insider. Clearly there are many
more instances of the former than the latter. Yet, as we shall see that
for the purposes of our analysis there need only be an infinitesimally
small probability that such a Boesky insider may exist.
3 Insider Trading, The Boesky Insider & In-
formational Efficiency
We model the situation where an insider can trade freely based on her
information as a signaling game. In this game, the Insider chooses a
pricing strategy as described in the previous section. An outsider’s
strategy is a mapping Q : <+ → [0, 1] that represents the share
of the risky asset that she will supply for each price. In order to
describe an equilibrium one must also specify conditional beliefs of
an outsider, {Gρ}ρ≥0 where Gρ(·) is a distribution function whose
support is a measurable subset of [a, b]. Upon seeing a price ρ, an
outsider believes that the Insider ’s type is distributed according to
Gρ. We will refer to {Gρ}ρ≥0 as a system of beliefs.
Definition 1 A Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium consists of a pair of
strategies {p,Q} and a system of beliefs {Gρ}ρ≥0 such that:
(i) For all ρ in the range of p, Gρ is the conditional probability
distribution of S˜ obtained in a Bayesian fashion.
7/25/91
7This consists of buying a ”cap” (say through the purchase of a call option)
and selling a ”floor” (say through the sale of a put option). A ”zero cost collar”
is a special case where the cost of the cap is equal to the proceeds generated by
the sale of the floor.
(ii) p(s) ∈ arg maxρ(s− ρ)Q(ρ) and p(s) ≤ s/R.
(iii) Q(ρ) ∈ arg maxq∈[0,1] U(q, ρ,Gρ) for all ρ.
Conditions (ii)-(iii) in the above definition of an equilibrium re-
quire that traders’ choices are optimal given their beliefs. Condition
(ii) also takes into account that a dominant trader can refuse to trade.
Condition (i) forces the small traders to have rational expectations.
The following further terminology is used to describe equilibria.
A PBE is said to be fully revealing if the equilibrium pricing strategy
p is such that p(s) 6= p(t) whenever s 6= t. It is said to be completely
pooling if p(s) = p(t) for all s, t. A strategy that is neither fully
revealing nor completely pooling is said to be partially revealing .
A PBE is said to be continuous, if the equilibrium pricing strategy
is continuous. It is worthwhile noting that in a continuous equilib-
rium one does not require that Q is continuous. As we show in
Lemma (1), continuity of Q(·) in the range of p(·) is in fact implied
by the continuity of the latter through the incentive compatibility
constraints.
Proposition 1 Suppose that the set of Boesky Insiders is not empty,
i.e. B 6= ∅. In an equilibrium either there is no trade or, if there is
trade the following hold:
1. Every equilibrium is partially pooling.
2. If the equilibrium is continuous, then it is fully pooling.
The formal proof which is somewhat involved is in the Appendix.
Here we shall briefly sketch an argument that will convey the main
intuition by considering why an equilibrium cannot involve a positive
amount of trade by every type of Insider and be fully revealing. Also,
assume that there is exactly one type s∗ who is a Boesky Insider
and that u(w) = − exp{−γw} so that the outsiders display constant
absolute risk aversion of γ > 0. Then8,
x(ρ, s) =
1
1− s−ρR2ν
0
if s ≤ ρR,
if s− 2ν ≤ ρR ≤ s,
ρR ≤ s− 2ν
(4)
8See Chapter 4, Huang and Litzenberger [1990] for the algebra leading to
Formula (4).
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where ν = γσ2/2.
Given an equilibrium pricing strategy p(·) let q(s) = Q(p(s)) > 0
denote the associated equilibrium supply at s. As the dominant
trader can always choose not to trade, (Condition (ii) for an equilib-
rium) we have p(s) ≤ s/R for all s. Using routine arguments from
the theory of incentives it can be shown that p(·) and q(·) are both
non-decreasing. (See Lemma 1 in the Appendix.) The monotonicity
must hold in every equilibrium – whether it is separating or other-
wise. If the equilibrium is fully revealing then p(·) and q(·) must be
increasing. From this it is clear that 0 < q(s) < 1 for all s ∈ (a, b).
For if q(s) = 0 for some s, then q(t) = 0 for all t ≤ s. Likewise if
q(s) = 1 for some s then q(t) = 1 for all t ≥ s. In either case q(·)
would not be increasing.
By way of contradiction now suppose that p(·) is a continuous
and fully revealing equilibrium pricing strategy. When a small trader
observes the price p(s∗) it becomes common-knowledge that the large
trader has observed S˜ = s∗ and that the future price of the otherwise
risky asset is now s∗ for sure. Consequently, the bond and the asset
are now perfect substitutes. If p(s∗) < s∗/R, then the return on the
bond is lower than the return on the risky asset. As there is no risk
in either asset, a small trader’s unique best response is to retain her
entire endowment, i.e. q(s∗) = 0, in contradiction of the hypothesis
that every type trades a positive amount.
Therefore we are left with the possibility that p(s∗) = s∗/R. We
will now argue that this too leads to a contradiction by showing that
q(s∗) = 1. The requirement that q(s) is a best response to Player
D’s price p(s) tells us that q(s) = x(p(s), s) for all s 6= s∗. We know
that q(s) cannot be either zero or one in a fully revealing equilibrium.
Therefore from Eq. (4)
q(s) = 1− s− p(s)R
2ν
∀s 6= s∗. (5)
Since p(s∗) = s∗/R and p(·) is assumed to be continuous lims→s∗ q(s) =
1. In the Appendix (Lemma 1) we show that q(·) must be continu-
ous whenever p(·) is continuous. Therefore q(s∗) = lims→s∗ q(s) = 1
which violates the monotonicity of q(·). Therefore p(·) cannot be
fully revealing.
Note that even though the foregoing arguments were presented
as though the equilibrium is fully revealing, we have not used the full
force of this assumption. Indeed, we could have virtually repeated
the arguments to conclude that any continuous equilibrium must be
pooling in a neighborhood of s∗. It remains to rule out then the
possibility that a continuous equilibrium pricing strategy p(·) can be
partially revealing.
Again, suppose by way of contradiction, that there is an equi-
librium such that in an interval S = [α, β], the equilibrium price is
a constant ρ¯ but is strictly increasing in a left neighborhood of α.
When a small trader sees the price ρ¯, through Bayesian updating,
she believes that Player D’s type is distributed according to the pos-
terior distribution G(s) = (F (s)− F (α))/(F (β)− F (α)). Therefore
the equilibrium supply of the asset is, say, q¯ ∈ arg maxq U(q,G, ρ¯).
Through an application of the mean value theorem of integral calcu-
lus, it follows that q¯ = x(ρ¯, s¯) for some s¯ ∈ (α, β). On the other hand
lims↑α q(s) = lims↑α x(p(s), s) = x(ρ¯, α). As x(ρ¯, α) > x(ρ¯, s) we ar-
rive at the contradiction that q(·) is continuous at α. A symmetric
argument applies that the strategy cannot be increasing in any right
neighbourhood of β.
When we prove the general case, we are first required to prove
that in any equilibrium either every type trades a positive quantity
or there is no trade. This leads to the conclusion that 0 < q(s) < 1
for all s. Then a no-arbitrage argument as above establishes that
p(s∗) = s∗/R. Using various assumptions that an analogue of x(ρ, s)
must satisfy, we are able to show that p(·) must be pooling in a neigh-
borhood of s∗. Finally, an argument similar to the one in the previous
paragraph shows that p(·) is fully pooling if it is also continuous.
3.1 Existence of Equilibrium
In case of binary signals, the setup considered by Laffont and Maskin
[1990], a pooling equilibrium may not exist9 unless the signals are
sufficiently close, although a separating equilibrium always exists.
Here the presence of Boesky Insiders rule out the possibility of a
separating equilibrium. Therefore the question of existence of an
equilibrium requires a reconsideration. In this section, we provide
two sets of results. The first is a sufficient condition for checking
whether a candidate price-quantity pair (ρ∗, q∗) can be supported as
an outcome of a pooling equilibrium. This is Proposition 2 which
9See Proposition 9 of their paper.
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applicable for an arbitrary u(·) satisfying non-decreasing risk aver-
sion. After this, we shall consider in more detail the case when
outsiders display constant absolute risk-aversion.
Define then:
pi(s) = mR+ max
p
(s− ρR)x(ρ, b) (6)
pi(s) is the maximum profit of a type s Insider when an outsider
believes that the former is the highest type b.
Proposition 2 (ρ∗, q∗) can be supported as the outcome of a pooling
equilibrium if:
0 ≤ Rρ∗ ≤ a (7a)
q∗ = arg max
q
U(q, F, ρ∗) (7b)
v(a) ≥ pi(a) and v(b) ≥ pi(b) (7c)
where v(s) = mR+ (s− ρ∗R)q∗.
The formal proof is contained in the Appendix. The conditions
in Eq. (7a) and Eq. (7b) are easy to understand. Eq. (7a) ensures
that it is individually rational for the Insider to trader regardless of
her the signal she receives. This also ensures that the posterior belief
conditional on observing ρ∗ is the same as the prior belief. Eq. (7b)
ensures that the supply of q∗ is a best response of the outsider given
her beliefs, and the offered price. The strength of the Proposition is
that just the two inequalities in Eq. (7c) are sufficient to ensure that
(ρ∗, q∗) is an equilibrium outcome.
Indeed, in order to support the above as an equilibrium outcome,
we need to specify what happens at all the nodes out of the equi-
librium. We fix the beliefs of the outsiders as follows: Whenever
they see a price other than ρ∗, they believe that the Insider has
received the highest signal. In other words, they believe that the
Insider ’s type is b. Therefore if the Insider where to choose a price
that differs from ρ∗ and the outsiders were to best respond with the
above beliefs, the payoff of type s Insider is bounded above by pi(s).
To ensure that the Insider does not have an incentive to deviate,
her equilibrium payoff of v(s) must be at least pi(s) for all s. The
Proposition simplifies verification of this condition by asserting that
it suffices to ensure that the extreme types a and b do not have an
incentive to deviate. The proof of this fact involves showing that
pi(·) is convex. As v(·) is linear, if the inequalities in Eq. (7c) are
satisfied, then v(s) ≥ pi(s) for all s.
We now consider in greater detail the existence issue when an
outsider’s absolute risk-aversion is a constant γ. Let
δ =
E[S˜e−γS˜/2]
E[e−γS˜/2]
(8)
and recall ν = γσ2/2. The parameter δ depends only the conditional
prior distribution of S˜, whereas ν depends on the degree of risk-
aversion and the variance of the idiosyncratic risk. The existence of
a pooling equilibrium depends on the relationship between these two
parameters. Consider the following inequalities:
ν ≤ δ ≤ ν + a (9a)
ν ≥ (b− a)
2
4(b− δ) . (9b)
Proposition 3 Suppose that u(w) = −e−γw. Suppose the resulting
parameters (ν, δ) satisfy Inequality (9a) when ν ≤ (b− a)/2 and also
Inequality (9b) when ν ≥ (b− a)/2. Then a fully pooling equilibrium
exists in which the Insider acquires half the endowment of risky asset
of the outsider at the price (δ − ν)/R.
Hereafter, we shall refer to a regime with the equilibrium out-
comes described in the above Proposition as the PE regime and let
(ρpe, qpe) = ((δ − ν)/R, 1/2) to denote the equilibrium outcome.
The reader may find Figure 1 drawn in the (δ, ν) space helpful to
visualize the regions in which an the equilibrium outcomes described
in Proposition 3 are feasible.
Proof We will verify that (ρpe, qpe) satisfies Eq. (7b- 7c) and apply
Proposition 2. Equality (9a) is a simple rearrangement of Eq. (7a).
To see that (ρpe, qpe) satisfies Eq. (7b), first write the payoff of an
outsider from choosing q when facing a constant price ρ, given that
the posterior belief is the same as the prior F :
UI = U(q, F, ρ) =− e−γw0R−γqρR+γν(1−q)2
× E[e−γ(1−q)S˜]
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Figure 1: Equilibrim exists if (δ, ν) lies in the shaded region.
The picture is constructed as follows. Clearly a < δ < b
while ν ≥ 0. Inequality (9a) requires that (δ, ν) lie between
the two parallel lines ν = δ and ν = δ − a. The RHS of
Inequality (9b), regarded as a function of δ, is increasing,
convex and is supported by the line ν = δ − a, with δ =
(a + b)/2 being the point of tangency. It also has a fixed
point at δ0 = b +
√
a(2b− a) which, it may be verified
lies to the left of b. The picture is drawn schematically
with these points in mind. The shaded region is the set
described by the Inequalities (9b-9b).
UI is concave in q. By differentiating log(−UI) with respect to q
yields the following first order condition for an optimum:
ρ =
E[S˜e−γ(1−q)S˜ ]
E[e−γ(1−q)S˜ ]
− γ(1− q)σ2.
which clearly holds at (ρ, q) = (ρpe, qpe).
It remains to verify the two inequalities in Eq. (7c). Checking that
v(b) ≥ pi(b) is relatively straightforward. For, pi(b) is the monopoly
profit of the type b Insider under full information. This is achieved
if she acquires half the endowment of the risky asset at a unit price
ρ = (b− ν)/R. On the other hand, in the proposed equilibrium, she
acquires an identical quantity at the price ρpe. Since δ < b, it follows
that pi(b) ≤ v(b).
Seeing pi(a) ≤ v(a) is little more involved. When the supply is
being determined as per x(ρ, b), it is clear from Eq. (4) that unless
a price of at least b− 2ν is offered, an outsider will refuse to supply
a positive quantity. When ν is sufficiently low, so that there is not
much idiosyncratic risk in the asset, the desired price (b−2ν) will be
greater than a. In this case, pi(a) = mR as no positive quantity will
be acquired by the type a Insider. For such values of ν, pi(a) ≤ v(a)
holds trivially as long as Inequality (9a) holds. In contrast, when
ν ≥ (b−a)/2, there interior solution to type a Insider ’s maximization
problem which yields
pi(a) = mR+
ν
2
(
1− b− a
2ν
)2 (10)
Comparing the above with v(a) = mR + (a − δ + v)/2 shows that
pi(a) ≤ v(a) is equivalent to Inequality (9b). 
For subsequent analysis, it is useful to record the respective equi-
librium utility of the Insider and the outsiders in under the PE
regime:
VPE = mR+ (S¯ − δ + ν)/2 (11)
UPE = −eγw0+3γν/4e−γδ/2E[e−S˜/2]. (12)
4 Regulated vs. Unregulated Insider Trading
In this section we analyze the welfare implications of regulating in-
sider trading. Under the regulation we consider, after the Insider
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receives the signal, she has one of two options. She can publicly de-
clare the signal she has received and then trade. If she chooses not
to disclose, then she must abstain from trading.
The above restriction is a fairly accurate representation of the
most common restriction on insider trading. However, we stylize the
environment by assuming that any disclosure of the Insider is fully
verifiable. This is, of course, an idealization. In reality, convincing a
court of exactly how much a trader knew so that she is in breach of
the Securities and Exchange Act is an uphill task for the prosecution.
Yet it is the assumption of perfect verifiability that provides the most
hospitable environment for making a case against insider trading.
We will refer to this regime with the legal restriction on insider trade
as the NI regime. Define
∇ = E[e
−γS˜ ]
E[e−γS˜/2]
− e−γδ/2. (13)
The following result provides a comparison of the welfare of the
traders under the PE and the NI regimes depending on how ∇, δ
and S¯, the different parameters of the prior distribution F , relate
to one another.
Proposition 4 Suppose that the hypotheses of Proposition 3 hold
and in addition ν ≤ a.
1. If δ > S¯, regulation makes the Insider better off and the out-
siders worse off.
2. If δ < S¯, regulation makes the Insider worse off. The outsiders
are also worse of if (and only if ) ∇ > 0.
Proof For almost all s, by revealing her private information, a type
s Insider faces the supply curve x(·, s), which is given by Eq. (4).
By hypothesis ν ≤ a. Therefore, reaction of the outsiders as a given,
the Insider of type s achieves a positive maximum profit by quantity
qni = 1/2 and setting a price
pni(s) = (s− ν)/R. (14)
and the expected price is therefore
ρni = S¯ − ν. (15)
First substitute pni(s) to get w˜ = w0R+s−ν+ ˜/2 to be the random
wealth in state s under NI for all10 s. The ex-ante utility of the
Insider and a typical outsider respectively obtained by substituting
appropriately in Eq. (1) and Eq. (2) as being:
VNI = mR+ ν/2 (16)
UNI = −e−γw0R+3γν/4E[e−γS˜ ] (17)
Direct algebraic manipulation shows that
VPE > VNI ⇔ δ < S¯ (18)
and that
UPE > UNI ⇔ ∇ > 0. (19)
To complete the proof, it suffices to show that ∇ is necessarily posi-
tive whenever δ > S¯. This can be seen as follows:
E[e−γS˜ ]− e−γδ/2E[e−γS˜/2]
> E[e−γS˜ ]− e−γS¯/2E[e−γS˜/2]
> E[e−γS˜ ]− E[e−γS¯/2]E[e−γS˜/2] (Since e−x is convex)
≥ 0
where the last inequality follows from the fact that E[X2] ≥ E[X]2
for any random variable X. 
Though its proof is somewhat mechanical, fortunately it is pos-
sible to offer some intuition for the welfare comparisons presented
in Proposition 4. Note that under both the regimes, the Insider
acquires an amount qpe = qni = 1/2, independent of the signal she
receives. The important difference between the regimes is that under
the NI regime, the price is a random variable pni(S˜) whereas under
the PE regime, the price is a constant. It is this variation in prices
that causes the various welfare effects.
After all the Insider, being risk-neutral, does not care about the
idiosyncratic risk. The question of whether she prefers the PE or the
NI regime is simply a question of comparing the (expected) prices,
10This is true for all s as the assumption ν ≤ a ensures that acquiring qni = 1/2
at the price pni(s) is individually rational.
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which are ρni = S¯ − ν and ρpe = δ − ν. The equivalence in Eq. (18)
is then immediate. An outsider on the other hand cares about the
idiosyncratic risk. When δ > S¯ the expected price she receives for her
asset under NI regime, namely ρni is lower than the expected price
under the PE regime, namely ρpe. What is more the former has a
greater variance. Naturally, regulation makes the risk averse outsider
worse off in this case. This leads to Part 1 of the Proposition.
In contrast, when δ < S¯, it does not necessarily follow that an
outsider prefers regulation. Even though the expected price she re-
ceives for her endowment is now higher under regulation, the price is
random. Therefore if the difference between δ and S¯ is not too large,
then she too, like the Insider, may well prefer the pooling equilib-
rium to regulated trade – the higher expected price being the risk
premium. If this were true, then the pooling equilibrium is Pareto
superior to the regulated outcome as stated by Part 2 of the Propo-
sition.
The fact that the Insider may prefer the informationally inef-
ficient PE regime must seem somewhat unintuitive. After all the
regulation acts as a pre-commitment device allowing her to credi-
bly reveal her information. One might have thought this possibility
for the Insider to fully exploit her monopoly position without being
constrained quantity constrained (as in Laffont and Maskin [1990])
to to credibly reveal her information cannot be improved upon. Yet,
the Proposition shows this need not the case. The resolution to this
puzzle comes from supply side.
With full information, it is the quantity that is traded is a con-
stant. The Insider is forced to charge a price that depends on her
signal to induce the outsiders to supply the quantity qni in each state.
To escape the variability in the price fluctuations, the outsiders may
prefer to offer the same quantity for a lower price. It is evident then
the the likelihood of this being the case depends on the particulars
of the prior distribution F .
To the extent that the legal restriction works as a pre-commitment
device is similar to that Ausubel [1990]. It is a worthwhile remark
that the restriction leads to the opposite conclusion from ours.
Some indication of when the parameters are such that PE Pareto
dominates the NI regime can be had from considering the case where
(b−a)/2 > a. In this case, the region in the parameter space to which
Proposition 4 applies to is shown as the shaded triangle in Figure 2,
as it is only in this region that ν ≤ a. Observe that the triangle does
a+b
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Figure 2: Proposition 4 applies only in the shaded region.
not change as b increases. However, δ is a function of b, and is likely
to be increasing in b. Therefore for b sufficiently large, Part 1 of the
Proposition may be inapplicable. This for instance is the case when
F is uniformly distributed on [a, b]. Direct computation reveals that
δ = 2 +
ae−a/2 − be−b/2
e−a/2 − e−b/2
in which case lim
b→∞
δ = (a + 2) and S¯ = (a + b)/2 > δ. In this case,
if the outsiders are better off, Part 2 of Proposition 4 must be true,
that is the PE regime is Pareto Superior to NI.
Corollary 1 Suppose that u(w) = −e−w. Suppose F is uniformly
distributed on [a, b] such that (b−a) > 4. For all ν such that δ−a ≤
ν ≤ a, the informationally inefficient PE regime Pareto dominates
the regulated and informationally efficient NI regime.
Proof Direct computation shows that
A =
E(e−S˜)
E(e−S˜/2)
=
e−a/2 + e−b/2
2
.
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The log derivative A is −b/2, while the log derivative of exp{−δ/2} is
−∂δ/∂b which is exponential in b. Therefore e−δ decreases at a much
faster rate than does A with respect to b. Moreover lim
b→a
Ae−a/2 and
lim
b→∞
e−a/2/2. Therefore lim
b→a
∇ = 0 (while lim
b→∞
∇ = e−a/2(0.5−e−1) >
0). Therefore, ∇ > 0 for all b. Since δ < a+ 2 and S¯ = (a+ b)/2, we
have δ < S¯. Apply Part 2 of Proposition 4 to complete the proof. 
5 Discussion and Conclusion
5.1 Public Confidence, Liquidity and Insider Trading
Insider trading was outlawed in most countries long ago11. These
bans do not stop so-called corporate ”insiders” (such as managers,
officers and directors) from trading per se. The bans outlaw trading,
by a person12, on the basis of material, price-sensitive, non-public
information. There are well documented fairness as well as effi-
ciency arguments in favor of such legislation. Though the academic
11For instance the Securities and Exchange Commission (”SEC”) has prohibited
insider trading since the Securities and Exchanges Act of 1934 (Section 10(b)
and SEC Rule 10b-5 generally and Section 14(e) and Rule 14e-3 with respect to
takeovers) and strengthened such prosition with the Insider Trading Sanctions
Act of 1984 and the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of
1988. Many other countries’ bans are also long held.
12Who qualifies as a ”person” varies by jurisdiction and is a matter of some
debate. In many countries outside the US it is taken to mean any person, regard-
less of their relationship with the company in question. In the United States
attention has generally been restricted to those who owe a fiduciary duty to the
company. However, the boundary of who owes such a duty is somewhat uncer-
tain. This was partially clarified in Chiarella v United States where an employee
of a financial printer (Vincent Chiarella) was charged by the SEC with illegal in-
sider trading but later cleared by the Supreme Court. The SEC has also pursued
cases under the ”missapropriation theory” which holds that even those without
a fiduciary duty may be charged with deceitful acquisition and misuse of infor-
mation belonging to a party to whom they owe a fiduciary duty. The landmark
case was James H. O’Hagan v United States (1996). The Supreme Court found
in favor of the SEC. It had previously been uncertain whether they supported
the misappropriation doctrine, since being split 4-4 in Carpenter v United States
(1987).
Recently the SEC has sought (under section 14(e)-3 of the Securities and Ex-
change Act) to broaden illegal insider trading to any person (at least in the case
of a takeover bid), even if they do not owe any fiduciary duty, much like in other
jurisdictions. This has been rejected (as exceeding the SEC’s authority) by the
Court of Appeals in Chesterman v United States (1990).
literature has focused almost exclusively on direct effiiciency argu-
ments, (Ausubel 1990 is a notable exception), the public rationale for
regulation of insider trading is heavily focused on notions of public
confidence. It is frequently claimed by policymakers, commenta-
tors and market participants that insider trading ”undermines pub-
lic confidence” in securities markets. The following quotations are
illustrative:
If the investor thinks he’s not getting a fair shake, he’s not
going to invest, and that is going to hurt capital invest-
ment in the long run.” - Arthur Levitt (former Chairman
SEC and American Stock Exchange)13
“Powerful Wall Street tycoons convinced former Presi-
dent Bill Clinton not to pardon junk-bond king Michael
Milken in a furious last-minute battle, The Post has learned.
Personal phone calls to Clinton and White House aides
- arguing that the widely expected Milken pardon would
undermine public confidence in financial markets - tipped
the balance...The opponents of a pardon included Citi-
group’s influential Robert Rubin, a former treasury sec-
retary in the Clinton administration.”14
“It should give impetus to those dealing in securities and
thereby bring back public confidence.” - Franklin D. Roo-
sevelt proposing to Congress the legislation which became
the Securities Act of 1933 (quoted in Ausubel 1990)15.
The Public Confidence argument is directly concerned with the
quality of information which insiders posses. Indeed, it is largely
concerned with extreme cases. The rationale for prohibition of trad-
ing on ”material, price sensitive, non-public information” is not to
prevent market professionals doing their job. In the words of the
13”The Epidemic of Insider Trading - The SEC is Fighting a Loosing Battle to
Halt Stock-Market Abuses” Business Week 4/29/85
14New York Post 2/1/01
15As Ausubel (1990) notes the Securities Act of 1933 was a forerunner to the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, and was concerned with information dis-
closure in Initial Public Offerings (”IPOs”).
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Wall Street Journal, ”Market professionals earn their keep by analyz-
ing companies, crunching numbers, interviewing company executives.
Their job, in other words, is to come up with material information
not yet discovered by the market.”16
The rationale for insider trading laws is not to prevent people
trading when they sense something, rather when they know some-
thing. Such laws are designed to stop Boesky Insiders from trading.
There is significant evidence that corporate insiders earn above mar-
ket returns. Seyhun (1992) documents that in the United States
”corporate insiders earned an average of 5.1 percent abnormal prof-
its over a one-year holding period between 1980 and 1984, increas-
ing further to 7.0 percent after 1984”. This kind of insider trading,
though it may be technically illegal, has no apparent negative ef-
fect on liquidity and public confidence. Indeed, the huge rise in the
liquidity of US equities markets over the 1980s and ’90s has been at
least correlated with a more than fourfold rise in trading of corporate
insiders (Seyhun, 1992). Such trading, illegal or not, is rarely, if ever,
pursued by the SEC. It is the Boeskies and Milkens who raise the
spectre of diminished public confidence in securities markets. Not
because they are insiders, but because they are Boesky Insiders.
The quantity traded in the equilibrium identified in Proposition 3
is as high as the quantity traded when insider trade is regulated.
Therefore, trading on the basis of private information does not nec-
essarily lead to lower liquidity. This observation is somewhat dif-
ferent from the findings of Glosten (1988) and Bajeux and Rochet
(1989), who argue that insider trading decreases liquidity and Leland
(1992) who as part of a general exploration of the efficiency of insider
trading, finds similarly. A somewhat different argument is presented
in Ausubel (1990) which articulates an efficiency argument for pub-
lic confidence in securities markets. Utilizing a two stage model in
which there is first investment in a productive asset, and then merely
exchange, he argues that insider trading leads to reduced confidence
by outsiders and that this may in fact damage insiders though a
reduction in investment. Our work does not directly address the
important issue of public confidence. A reconsideration of Ausubel’s
work when the insiders differ in the quality of their information would
be a fruitful exercise.
16Wall Street Journal 11/18/86.
5.2 Equilibrium Selection
To draw a direct comparison with the work of Laffont and Maskin
(1990), one could consider our model when B = ∅, i.e. there are no
Boesky Insiders. In this case one can construct a separating equi-
librium by solving an appropriate differential equation17. In this
equilibrium, the insider’s expected profit would be lower than they
would have been under NI. This is because under NI the large trader
does not face the quantity constraints. For the parameters iden-
tified by Proposition 4 or Corollary 1, the pooling equilibrium of
Proposition 3 which dominates regulated trade will also dominate
the revenue under the separating equilibrium.
If one agrees with Laffont and Maskin that the large trader can
influence beliefs in the market to select her favorite equilibrium, then
it may be in the interest of the large trader sow the ”grain of doubt”
about being a Boesky Insider, even if she is not. If they are able
to sow this ”grain of doubt”, and trade occurs, they will get their
preferred (pooling) equilibrium.
5.3 Robustness of Equilibria
One way to overcome the sensitivity of continuous PBE to zero prob-
ability events to assume that incentive compatibility conditions are
satisfied except perhaps on a set of measure zero. This would rule
out the impact of a zero probability event. Even if one assumes this
position, Proposition 1 could be reinterpreted as a failure of equilib-
ria to be robust to small perturbations. For one could just as well
assume that B = (−, ) so that the set of Boesky Insiders is a set of
measure zero. Any continuous equilibrium is necessarily fully pool-
ing for all  > 0, even though the case  = 0 may allow for a fully
separating equilibrium.
5.4 Conclusion
The existing literature on insider trading has tended to over empha-
size the role of informational efficiency. To achieve a more complete
understanding of the allocative inefficiency, or otherwise, of insider
trading, and possible regulatory remedies, one must consider public
17There may not be an explicit solution. With constant absolute risk aversion,
the separating equilibrium pricing strategy, if it exists, is implicitly given by
p(s) = ν log(s− p(s)− 2ν)− s/2 + C, where C is a constant of integration.
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confidence issues in addition to those considered here. This may in-
volve combining features of the type of model considered in Ausubel
(1990) with those contained in this paper.
6 Appendix
Given an equilibrium {p,Q,Gρ} recall that q(s) = Q(p(s)) is the
equilibrium supply of the risky asset in state s. Let
V (t, s) = mR+ (s− p(t))q(t) (20)
v(s) = V (s, s). (21)
v(s) is the equilibrium payoff of the dominant trader and V (t, s) is
the payoff of a type s trader if she pretends to be of type t and offers
the price p(t) instead p(s) as required in the equilibrium.
The proof of Proposition 1 Lemma 1-3. Of these only Lemma 3
relies on the fact that B 6= ∅.
Lemma 1 If p(·) is an equilibrium pricing strategy and q(·) the cor-
responding equilibrium supply, the following hold:
1. q(·) is non-decreasing.
2. Let α = sup{s|q(s) = 0} if q(s) = 0 for some s and α = a
otherwise. In the region (α, b], p(·) is non-decreasing and is
increasing if and only if q(·) is also increasing.
3. v(·) is continuous.
4. If p is continuous, then q is also continuous.
Proof In an equilibrium, a type s trader must have no incentive
to choose the price p(t), where s 6= t. Therefore
v(s) ≥ V (t, s)
= v(t) + (s− t)q(t). (22)
As the above must hold for all s, t we have
(s− t)q(t) ≤ v(s)− v(t) ≤ (s− t)q(s) (23)
If s > t it is clear from above that q(s) ≥ q(t) and therefore q is
non-decreasing. This proves part 1.
To see that p must also be non-decreasing, assume by way of
contradiction that there exist α < s < t such that p(s) > p(t). Then
v(s) = mR+ (s−Rp(s))q(s)
< mR+ (s−Rp(t))q(t)
≤ V (t, s)
contradicting that p(·) is an equilibrium. We leave it to the reader
to follow the above inequalities to conclude that p(·) is increasing if
and only if q(·) is increasing. This completes Part 2.
Part 3 is immediate from Equation (23) while Part 4 is immediate
from the definition of v(s).
Lemma 2 Suppose p(·) is a fully revealing equilibrium pricing strat-
egy. The associated equilibrium supply q(·) is such that either q(s) =
0 for all s ∈ [a, b) or q(s) > 0 for all s ∈ [a, b].
Proof Let p(·) be a fully revealing equilibrium. Define α =
sup{s : q(s) = 0} and suppose, by way of contradiction that a ≤
α < β.
Since q(·) is monotonic, it follows that q(s) is zero for all s < α
and is positive for all s > α. By pretending to be of type s < α, the
dominant trader can ensure a payoff of mR. Therefore mR+q(s)(s−
Rp(s)) ≥ mR for all s which in particular implies p(s) ≤ s/R for all
s > α. Taking the limit on both sides of this inequality as s decreases
to α, we note that ρ+ ≤ α/R where ρ+ is the right-hand limit of p(·)
at α.
Now suppose ρ+ < α/R. Then we can find t < α < s such that
p(s) < t/R. The equilibrium payoff of type t is mR. On the other
hand if she pretends to be of type s, then her payoff is mR+q(s)(t−
Rp(s)) which is strictly greater than her equilibrium payoff. This
contradicts the fact that p(·) is an equilibrium pricing strategy.
This leaves us with the possibility that ρ+ = α/R. Now for all
s > q(s) (except perhaps for s = s∗), as p(·) is fully revealing, we
must have q(s) = x(p(s), s)) for all s > α. By taking the limits on
both sides of the above we note that the right hand limit of q(·) at α
is lims↓α x(α/R, α) = 1. As q(·) is monotonic, this implies q(s) = 1
for all s > α.
Lemma 3 Suppose B 6= ∅ and p(·) is an equilibrium pricing strat-
egy such that q(s) > 0 for all s ∈ [a, b]. Then p(·) cannot be fully
revealing.
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Proof The proof is again by contradiction. Suppose p(·) is fully
revealing and if possible q(s) > 0 for all s.
At s∗, once a small trader observes the price p(s∗), it becomes
common-knowledge that the actual return on the risky asset is s∗/p(s∗).
If this is higher than R, then q(s∗) = 0 and we have a contradiction.
On the other hand if s∗/p(s∗) < R, then the return on the bond is
higher than the risky asset and hence q(s∗) = 1. Monotonicity of
q(·) would then imply that q(s) = 1 for all s ≥ s∗ which in turn
contradicts the fact that p(·) is fully revealing.
It remains to consider the case when p(s∗) ≥ s∗/R. Let ρ+ denote
the right hand limit of p(·) at s∗. Since p(·) is increasing this limit
is well defined. Moreover, ρ+ ≥ p(s∗) = s∗/R. Since for all q(s) =
x(p(s), s) for all s ≥ s∗, lims↓ q(s) = x(ρ+, s∗). Since ρ+ ≥ p(s∗ =
s∗/R), it we have x(ρ+, s∗) = 1. Again, by monotonicity of q(·),
q(s) ≥ x(ρ+, s∗) = 1 for all s ≥ s∗ and we have a contradiction as
before.
Proof (Proposition 1). Suppose q(t) > 0 for some s ∈ [a, b]. If
p(·) were fully revealing, then by Lemma 2, q(s) > 0 for all s ∈ [a, b]
violating Lemma 3. Therefore p(·) cannot be fully revealing.
To complete the proof, we must show that if p(·) is continuous,
then it is fully pooling. Let α be as we defined in the proof of
Lemma 2 and by hypothesis a < α. As p(·) is continuous, there
exists  > 0 such that p(·) is strictly increasing in the region (α −
, α). Therefore q(s) = x(s, p(s)) for every s ∈ (α − , α) and hence
lims↑α q(s) = x(p(α), α). On the other hand, q(α) = x(p(α), s) for
some s ∈ (α, β). Therefore, lims↑α q(s) 6= q(α) violating the fact
that q(·) must also be continuous when p(·) is continuous. A similar
argument shows that β = b.
Proof (Proposition 2) Let
ρm(s) = arg max
ρ
(s− ρ)(x(ρ, b))
qm(s) = x(ρm(s), b).
By definition, pi(s) = mR + (s − ρm(s))qm(s). By the Envelope
Theorem, pi′(s) = qm(s). Arguments similar to those in the proof of
Part I of Lemma 1 can now be used to show that ρm(s) and qm(s)
are both (weakly) increasing in s and hence pi(·) is convex.
Take the system of beliefs to be as in the proof of Proposition :
a small trader’s posterior on S˜ is the same as her prior if ρ = ρ∗ and
when ρ 6= ρ∗ she believes the highest type b.
q∗ by construction is a best response to the realized price ρ∗.
Moreover, the beliefs of the small trader are in accordance with
Bayesian updating.
Given ρ∗ < a/R, it is clear that Player D is better off trading
the equilibrium q∗ > 0 than not trading. If a type s trader were
to deviate an choose a price ρ 6= ρ∗, given the beliefs of the small
trader, she faces the x(·, b) as the supply of risky asset. Therefore,
her maximum payoff from such a deviation is pi(s). To prevent a
deviation, one must have v(s) ≥ pi(s) for all s. Since s = λa+(1−λ)b
for some λ ∈ [0, 1]
v(s) = λv(a) + (1− λ)v(b)
≥ λpi(a) + (1− λ)pi(b)
≥ pi(s)
(24)
where the first of the above inequalities is by hypothesis and the
second is due to the convexity of pi.
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